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In the classic paper, Topel and Ward (1992) document that mobility between employers can account for one-third of wage growth for men in the first 10 years of their careers.
Coupled with the fact that wage growth diminishes rapidly after this critical period,it is clear mobility between employers plays an important role in lifetime earnings. 1 In recent years, however, the U.S. economy has become remarkably less dynamic. 2 Employer mobility has plummeted by approximately 30 percent between 1995 and 2016. 3 Concerningly, in Forsythe (2017) I find that the reduction in hiring during the Great Recession was primarily concentrated among workers in the first 10 years of their careers, the same workers Topel and Ward (1992) identified as having the most to gain from such mobility.
With career opportunities waning between firms, career development and wage growth within firms take on greater importance. Thus, in this paper I focus on life cycle career dynamics within firms. In previous work (Forsythe 2018) , I find that wage growth is closely tied to the direction of occupational mobility. In this paper, I develop a variety of occupational ranking metrics and investigate how mobility rates and wage returns to mobility within the firm vary over the life cycle, using data from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) and the tenure supplement. I then investigate how such mobility has changed over the last two decades.
Similar to mobility between employers, I find that occupational mobility within firms declines over the life cycle. In addition, I find that the average change in occupational quality declines with age. While young workers make substantial gains in occupational quality upon changing occupations, this falls steadily with worker age until age 50, at which point the average occupational change is to a lower-quality occupation. These patterns hold across a variety of ranking metrics, using occupational wages, task-based measures, and occupational ratings for required education or experience.
These average changes mask important differences in the types of occupational moves 1 See, for instance, Murphy and Welch (1992) and more recently Manning and Swaffield (2008) . 2 See, for instance, Hyatt and Spletzer (2013, 2016) . 3 See Figure 5. 2 individuals make over the life cycle. The magnitude of changes in occupational rank is Ushaped over the life cycle, with young workers making the smallest distance of moves up and down, and magnitudes flattening through midcareer and then shrinking again after age 60. However these life cycle differences are not reflected in wage growth: young workers experience the largest wage changes with up and down mobility, despite making moves of the smallest magnitude.
The fact that workers experience downward mobility throughout their careers indicates that career-development is substantially more nonlinear than evidenced in aggregate wage growth. Such moves are associated with reduced wage growth on average, with many individuals experiencing real wage losses. Wage growth is fastest for individuals who move to higher-ranked occupations, which holds for workers in all stages of the life cycle.
In the second part of the paper, I examine trends in mobility and wage growth over the past two decades. I find that average wage growth for young workers has fallen precipitously since the mid-1990s, while wage growth for midcareer workers has varied little over this time period. The bulk of the reduction in wage growth for young workers is because of reduced wage growth within firms. I find that the returns to upward mobility for young workers within the firm fell by 8 percentage points after 2006, while average returns to downward mobility fell by 5 percentage points.
Although I find total occupational mobility has fallen since 1995, this is primarily because of a secular decline in mobility between firms, which is associated with much higher rates of occupational change than we see for individuals remaining within employers. Rates of internal mobility do exhibit a negative trend break around 2002 but have been roughly flat from 2005 to 2016. In addition, I do not find any systematic variation over time in the direction of mobility (either within or between firms), or the magnitude of occupational change, which could explain the deterioration in returns to mobility within firms.
Thus, while falling labor market dynamism does not appear to extend to job mobility within firms, the deterioration in wage returns within firms leads to another margin by which 3 labor market conditions worsened for young workers throughout the 2000s.
Related Literature
Since early work by Shaw (1984) , the literature on occupational mobility and tenure has expanded rapidly. Work by Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) documents the substantial role of occupational tenure on earnings, arguing occupational tenure can explain more of earnings growth than industry or employer tenure. This relationship has been confirmed in other settings, including Denmark (Groes 2010) and Sweden (Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom 2014) .
On the other hand, another body of literature has documented substantial wage returns from occupational mobility. In previous work (Forsythe 2018) , I show that wage growth from occupational mobility depends on the direction of mobility: individuals who move to higher-quality occupations experience substantially faster wage growth than occupationalstayers, while those who move to lower-quality occupations experience substantially slower wage growth than stayers. Other papers have shown the importance of this directionality of mobility, in particular, Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2013) , who document similar patterns of upward and downward mobility using Danish administrative data, and Frederiksen, Halliday, and Koch (2016) , who use the same Danish data to find that wage returns match the direction of mobility for moves in and out of management.
Several recent papers have bridged these two perspectives by emphasizing the role of taskspecific human capital. By situating occupations in Euclidean space based on detailed information of occupational tasks, Poletaev and Robinson (2008) and Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) find that this distance is an important determinant of wage losses and growth based on involuntary and voluntary mobility, respectively. Most similar to this paper, Robinson (2018) augments his previous work on distance with measures of direction. Although the primary focus of the paper is on displaced workers, Robinson (2018) finds that the average direction of moves for all workers becomes more negative in the second half of the career. This is consistent with what I find for internal movers; however, I will show that this average masks important differences in the magnitude of upward and downward moves over the life cycle.
By focusing on occupational movements within firms, this paper relates to a large literature in personnel economics on careers and job mobility within employers. The two classic citations, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994a,b) , reveal many patterns about wage and promotion dynamics within firms; however, the firm studied in these papers was somewhat unique in the fact that it did not use demotions. Other studies using data from different firms reveal a wide variety of practices. See Frederiksen, Lange, and Kriechel (2017) , who harmonize several personnel data sets. Further, some of the earliest work on occupational mobility within firms -for example, Gitelman (1966) -found substantial rates of upward and downward occupational mobility in a watch company in the second half of the 19th century.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on how job mobility and wage growth vary over the life cycle. As referenced in the introduction, Topel and Ward (1992) is the classic citation; however, others have documented that mobility rates fall over the life cycle, including a series of earlier papers beginning with Bartel (1980) and Borjas (1981) . Manning and Swaffield (2008) find that life cycle job mobility patterns are similar for male and female workers in the United Kingdom. Most closely, McCue (1996) shows that promotion rates fall over the life cycle and wages rise faster with promotion.
Methodology
I use monthly CPS survey data from January 1994 through October 2016. The CPS is a large national survey of U.S. households, which provides cross-sectional data for national employment statistics. The CPS is conducted as a panel, in which each household is surveyed up to eight times, thus allowing measurement of labor market mobility. Before 1994, the CPS used independent coding -that is, each month the survey treated respondents as new participants. This led to a great deal of noise in the coding of occupations and industries, and did not allow one to distinguish between firm-stayers and firm-changers. 4 With the major survey redesign in 1994, individuals were asked if they still worked for the same employer and if their duties and activities had changed, allowing a cleaner observation of occupational mobility, but only for individuals remaining within the same employer.
The CPS is structured as a rotating panel, wherein each household is surveyed for four consecutive months, takes an eight-month break, and then is surveyed for four more months.
This allows researchers to match individuals across pairs of months and observe labor market changes. In particular, I use a procedure developed by Madrian and Lefgren (1999) to match individuals using administrative IDs and confirm matches using sex, race, and age. As the fifth month of the survey returns to independent coding, there is only mobility information for six pairs of months for each individual.
In my specifications, I restrict the sample to individuals employed in the first month with nonallocated occupation codes. I exclude month pairs spanning January 2003 and January 2011, the times at which the CPS changed occupational coding systems. The final sample includes 11.6 million observations. The first three columns of Table A .1 in Appendix A provide summary statistics.
Although the matched monthly sample provides a large sample for observing occupational mobility within firms, the CPS only collects wage data during survey months four and eight, which are not linked via dependent coding. This makes it impossible to determine if the individual was employed in the same firm at both points in time. In order to measure wage changes with occupational mobility, I follow a procedure I developed in previous work (Forsythe 2018) , which uses the Tenure Supplement to determine if the worker was employed at the same firm during both wage observations. The main limitation of this approach is 4 See Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) for a detailed exploration of this problem. 6 that it restricts the sample size, since the tenure supplement is only conducted one month every two years. 5 The second half of Table A .1 provides summary statistics for this sample.
Measuring Occupational Mobility
In order to measure occupational mobility within firms, I utilize the dependent coding discussed in the previous section. In particular, once individuals have affirmed that they have not changed employers, they are asked, "Have the usual activities and duties of your job changed since last month?" If yes, then the enumerator asks open-ended questions to elicit a description of the job, which is then assigned to a particular occupation by trained coders.
Thus, I define internal occupational mobility in the monthly sample to be individuals who report that their duties have changed and are coded to a new occupation from the previous month.
This leads to substantially lower rates of occupational mobility than I measure in the annual match, which is based on independent coding. In this case, between the two survey months, the CPS enumerator asks the respondent to describe their job without reference to the previous response. For individuals in this sample, I define occupational mobility as changing occupational codes between survey months. This is the same methodology that I use to construct occupational mobility for individuals who change firms, since the CPS does not use dependent coding for any between-firm movements. Table A .2 shows how rates of occupational mobility differ across the two samples.
Measuring Occupational Quality
In order to categorize movements within firms, I construct several occupational quality indices. I use two sources: median occupational wages from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey, and occupational characteristics from the O*NET database.
To construct the OES wage index, I follow the methodology of Acemoglu (1999) . The Since each occupation has hundreds of scores, I use methodology similar to Poletaev and Robinson (2008) and Robinson (2018) , using principal component analysis (PCA) to condense these variables into indices. This methodology takes advantage of the fact that many of the variables are correlated: for instance, occupations that require workers to have a high level of written expression also require a high level of written comprehension. PCA is a procedure to construct linear combinations of variables that explain the most variation in the data.
The first index I construct I call the Occupational Quality Index. To create it, I include variables classified as worker ability and worker skills in the database. These include variables such as oral comprehension, stamina, and memorization. The variables that are weighted highest in this index are written expression, reading comprehension, judgment, and decision making. This factor is very similar to the largest factor identified in Poletaev and Robinson (2008) . Occupations that receive high scores include physicists, CEOs, neurologists, and judges. Occupations that receive low scores include fallers, mine shuttle car operators, dishwashers, and meatpackers. I normalize the index to range from 0 to 100. See Table A.4 for more details on the variables and occupations.
For the second index, I summarize management-relevant variables in the O*NET database to capture mobility that is closer to movements up and down a traditional promotion hierarchy. I include such variables as leadership, resource management skills, and decision-making skills. Table A .5 lists all included variables. The variables that are most important to this index include coaching and developing others, motivating subordinates, and management of personnel resources. CEOs receive the highest management score, while other high-scoring occupations include education administrators and frontline supervisors.
Occupations that receive low management scores include farmworkers, telemarketers, and food prep workers. I call this the Management Index and again normalize it to be between 0 and 100. See Table A .6 for more details on the variables and occupations.
In addition, I use three measures of occupational quality directly from O*NET: required experience, required education, and required training. I normalize these measures to be in terms of years required. In total, this gives me six occupational quality metrics.
Life Cycle Patterns of Mobility within Firms
In this section, I focus on establishing a set of facts about how occupational mobility within firms changes over the life cycle. I begin by examining how the rates of occupational mobility within firms using the monthly matched CPS sample. I then turn to measuring the distance of mobility, using a variety of ranking measures to show how the type of moves made differ over the life cycle. Finally, I turn to the annual CPS sample to examine how wage growth differs by the type of occupational mobility, and how these patterns change with worker age.
Rate of Occupational Mobility
The first set of results focuses on how the rate of occupational mobility varies over the life cycle. In Figure 1 , we see that the rate of mobility rises rapidly in the early 20s, peaking at age 23, then steadily falls over rest of the career. Nonetheless, even well into the 60s we see that workers change occupations at a rate of between 0.2 and 0.3 percent per month, which translates to an annual rate of at least one occupational move for between 2.3 and 3.5 percent of retirement age workers per year.
In Table 1 , I separate workers into five age bins: under 30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, and 60 and above. In Column (1) we see the binned version of Figure 1 , with the rate of occupational mobility falling steadily over the life cycle. In the next two columns, I separate workers into bins for those with less than a college degree (Column [2]) and those with at least a college degree (Column [3] ). If college provides specialized training, it may allow workers to enter directly into their preferred occupation, reducing occupational mobility. On the other hand, if college-educated workers are more likely to be promoted, we might see higher rates of job mobility. In fact, although we see similar rates of mobility for workers under 30 (0.52 percent per month), college-educated workers have lower rates of mobility than non-collegeeducated workers for each age bin. Nonetheless, these differences are not large enough to be statistically distinct. In Columns (4) and (5) we see that female workers have lower rates of job mobility early in the career (up to age 40), but higher rates of mobility in the latter years of their careers. Since mobility rates for workers across education and gender categories are quite similar, I will group all workers together to focus on variation by age.
Next I turn to measures of the magnitude of mobility for occupational changers inside the firm. In Figure 2 , I show the average change in OES wage score for occupational changers inside the firm by five-year age bins. Similar to what we see in the figure for the rate of occupational mobility, the quality change in occupational mobility rises in the early 20s then falls steadily. While workers in their early 20s on average move to occupations with $1.60 higher median wages, by age 40 the average wage change upon moving has deteriorated to zero. Above age 50 the point estimates are consistently negative but not statistically distinct from zero.
In Table 2 Here we see remarkably consistent results across the occupational distance measures.
Young workers without college degrees on average gain the most from occupational mobility, moving to jobs with $1.41 higher median wages, which have one-fifth of a year of additional required education and one-fourth of a year of additional required experience. These workers move about 1 percentile up the quality index. Although young workers with college degrees have smaller gains across all measures, they still move to occupations that pay $1.28 higher median wages and with half a percentile increase in the cognitive quality index. They earn smaller but positive and statistically significant improvements across all other dimensions.
For both educational groups, returns to mobility fall in the middle career years. Returns for midcareer workers are smaller than those for young workers but are primarily positive and significant. For workers over 60, the returns are primarily negative. Across all measures, those without college degrees have larger gains in the midcareer years than college-educated workers; however, estimates for those over 60 are noisier and less consistent. On balance, it appears that college-educated workers gain less in occupational ranking from mobility than those without college degrees.
In Tables A.7 and A.8 I separate the tables for female and male workers, respectively. Here we see that young and midcareer female workers appear to see larger improvements in job quality than male workers. However, late-career female workers without college degrees move to substantially lower-quality occupations on average, while equivalent males have positive but nonsignificant changes in occupational quality. For both male and female late-career workers, the point estimates for the average change in occupational quality are negative but not significant.
These patterns are consistent with results in Robinson (2018) , who finds that on average, younger workers (age 20-40) make larger magnitude moves than older workers (age 40-60), although there are some differences across samples and genders. Although I focus on a single rank of occupations, Robinson (2018) also uses additional vectors, which allows him to investigate how mobility changes based on four measures: analytic (equivalent to my quality index), fine motor skills, strength, and visual skills. Here he finds that the changes in the skill portfolio tend to be smaller in magnitude for older workers across the measures, although there is some evidence of increases in visual skills.
So far I have shown that both mobility rates and the distance of occupational change fall over the life cycle. In Figure 3 , I plot the change in OES score by age for upward (A) and downward (B) movers. Here we see that, although the average distance of moves falls over the life cycle, this masks increasing magnitudes of upward and downward movements into the midcareer. For workers moving to higher-ranked occupations, the average magnitude of the change increases through age 30, at which point it flattens for most of the career, falling in the early 60s. For workers moving to lower-ranked occupations, the average change in mobility falls rapidly through age 30, at which point it continues to fall more slowly until the late 60s, at which point the estimates become quite noisy. Thus, even though on average the change in occupational quality continues to fall with age, this masks a growing volatility of occupational mobility.
Thus, in this section I have demonstrated that occupational mobility within firms follows similar patterns to other types of life cycle mobility, with falling mobility rates with age and falling average magnitudes of changes. Nonetheless, even workers nearing retirement age have substantial rates of occupational mobility and move both up and down in ranking. In fact, although midcareer and older workers are the least likely to change occupations within the firm, conditional on moving they make larger magnitude changes, both up and down.
In the next section, I examine whether wage growth is consistent with the magnitude of occupational changes. Although this spurious mobility inflates the measured rates of occupational mobility, for the purposes of measuring wage changes with occupational mobility, this will serve to attenuate wage returns to mobility. This is because most individuals do not change occupations each year, thus the measured wage returns to occupational mobility combine the true occupational changers with occupation-stayers who are incorrectly coded as mobile. I will show that wage returns from occupational staying fall squarely in between wage growth from downward occupational changes and wage growth for upward occupational changes.
Wage Returns to Mobility over the Life Cycle
Thus, measurement error will attenuate wage changes from occupational mobility toward the modest wage growth earned by individuals who do not change occupations.
In this section, I run a series of linear regressions in which I regress the annual change in the real log hourly wage (in January 1994 dollars) on indicators for mobility. I include controls for race (nonwhite indicator), gender, education (seven categories), a cubic in age, and year. By focusing on the change in wages, I remove any time-invariant differences in wages, but there still may be differences in wage growth between demographic groups. These controls will help remove some of these differences between groups; however, in practice results are quite similar with and without these controls. I report robust standard errors.
I begin by examining some basic facts about how wage growth varies with occupational mobility on average, before examining heterogeneity by age. In Table 3 , I show how wage growth differs based on occupational mobility. Column (1) has no controls, while Column
(2) has controls for worker characteristics (other than age), and Column (3) includes cubic controls for worker age. In Panel A, I show how average real annual wage growth differs based on the worker mobility. Here we see that workers who change occupations see wage growth that is 0.4 percent faster than occupation stayers, who experience real wage growth of 2.7 percent; however, these differences are not statistically significant. In Panel B, I show how these changes in wages differ based on the direction of mobility. Here we see that individuals who move to higher-ranked occupations experience wage growth that is about 4 percentage points faster than those who stay in the same occupation, while those who move to lower-ranked occupations see wage growth that is about 3 percentage points slower than occupation stayers. These estimates are quite consistent with and without controls. Thus, while average wage growth for occupational movers is indistinguishable from wage growth for occupation stayers, this masks substantial heterogeneity in wage growth based on the direction of mobility. I next investigate how the returns to occupational mobility differ based on the distance of occupational change. In Table 4 , I regress the change in wages on the change in log OES wage score. I again separate the specifications between upward and downward mobility.
For each $1.00 change in median OES score for occupational movers, upward movers see wage growth of $0.12, while downward movers see wage losses of $0.08. Thus, although we do see substantial difference in the magnitude of wage growth based on the direction of occupational mobility, wages evolve substantially slower than the change in the occupational rank. Further, wages exhibit some degree of downward rigidity, in which downward changes are dampened. Now I want to examine how the returns to occupational mobility vary by age. In Table   5 , I now separate the specifications by 10-year age bins. Recall from the previous section that young workers have higher rates of occupational mobility and are relatively more likely to move to higher-quality occupations, but the magnitude of occupational change up and down grows over the life cycle. From the mean of the omitted category, we see that average wage growth for occupational stayers is largest for young workers, who gain 4.6 percent in real wages compared to 2.3 percent for those in their 30s, and 3.1 percent for those in their 40s. Wage growth drops dramatically after age 50, with growth rates of 1.5 percent for those in their 50s and 0.2 percent for those 60 and above. In Panel A, we again see small and insignificant differences in wage growth between occupational changers and stayers. In Panel B, I separate the occupational movers into upward and downward mobility. Again, the small and insignificant wage growth associated with occupational mobility masks substantial heterogeneity by the direction of mobility. For young workers under 30, the return to upward mobility is 6 percent faster wage growth than for occupational stayers, for total wage growth of over 10 percent. On the other hand, for young downward movers, wages grow 6.6 percent slower than for individuals who do not change occupations.
For midcareer and older occupational changers, wage growth is between 1 and 3 percentage points slower than for individuals who do not change occupations, while for upward occupational changers it is between 2 and 3 percentage points faster. Thus, although we see in Figure 3 that the distance of occupational changes grows over the life cycle, this is not reflected in realized wage growth for midcareer and older workers.
Discussion
In this section, I document several new facts about occupational mobility within firms over the life cycle. Mobility is especially important for early-career workers: young workers have the highest rates of internal occupational mobility, are the most likely to move to higherquality occupations, and garner the largest wage gains from upward mobility. However, throughout the life cycle we see substantial rates of downward mobility, which is associated with diminished real wage growth for workers of all ages.
One surprising result is the fact that the wage gains from upward mobility diminish over the life cycle, despite the fact that midcareer and older workers who move up are more likely to make larger magnitude moves. Such a pattern can be rationalized by models of firm-learning, such as Farber and Gibbons (1996) , in which information early in the career leads to larger revisions of the firm's belief about the worker's ability, while updates later in the career have a smaller impact.
Nonetheless, despite real wage growth on average, careers within firms are substantially more volatile than evident from what we see in aggregated wage growth. Many workers move to lower-ranked occupations, and have diminished wage growth or even wage losses upon doing so. Although the frequency of occupational mobility diminishes with age, downward occupational mobility is present for workers of all age. However, for young workers, these results indicate that there are substantial opportunities for career progression within the firm. In the next section I will investigate if these opportunities within firms were able to provide a reliable source of wage growth for young workers who found fewer opportunities between firms over the past two decades.
Trends in Mobility
As discussed in the introduction, there is a growing body of evidence of decreasing dynamism in the U.S. economy (e.g., Hyatt and Spletzer [2013] ). This is of particular concern for young workers, since mobility between firms has been shown to be an important source of wage progression. In the previous section, I document that this pattern plays out within the firm as well, with upward mobility associated with wage growth for all workers but especially for young workers. In this section, I investigate how these dynamics have changed over the last two decades, and compare within-and between-firm movements. I begin by examining how occupational mobility has changed since the mid-1990s. In Figure 4 I plot the share of individuals employed in a given month that report in the following month that their usual duties and activities have changed but have the same employer, or report both changing employers and changing occupations. In the top graph in Figure   4 , we see that occupational mobility has been falling since 1995. From a high of 2.9 percent of employed workers changing occupations each month, by 2016 the rate fell to 2.0 percent. This secular decline in occupational mobility appears to be especially pronounced during recessionary periods, demarcated in gray. Although declining occupational mobility is consistent with other forms of falling dynamism in the 2000s, this is a break from previous decades, which experienced rising occupational mobility (Kambourov and Manovskii 2008) .
In the bottom graph of Figure 4 , I separate the monthly occupational mobility into within-firm and between-firm movers. Here we see that the primary source of falling occupational mobility over the past two decades is a reduction in between-firm movers. In fact, although such mobility declines in conjunction with the two recessionary periods, we see stronger evidence that the pattern anticipates the recessions. On the other hand, occupational mobility within the firm appears to be relatively stable, with a negative trend break around 2002. Although this could be a cyclical response, the fact that we see no variation in occupational mobility within firms during the Great Recession suggests that the drop in the early 2000s may be unrelated to the business cycle.
Since the declining occupational mobility can be traced to between-firm movements, in Figure 5 I examine how rates of mobility between employers has changed over the same time period. In the top graph, I show that the pattern follows a similar pattern to the occupational mobility between firms, suggesting that the primary source of the falling rate of occupational mobility between firms is mechanically due to the reduction in the frequency of mobility between firms. Indeed, the share of individuals changing firms that report an occupational change has remained constant at near 60 percent through the sample period.
In the bottom graph in Figure 5 , I separate employer mobility by worker age. Here we see that almost all of the reduction in mobility between firms is due to workers under age 30. For midcareer workers (aged 30-60), as well as older workers (60+), we see lower rates of employer mobility that decline modestly. These results indicate that the decreasing dynamism of the U.S. economy primarily affects young workers, the very workers who have the most to gain from mobility. 
Comparing Returns to Mobility within and between Firms
Before examining the trends in wage gains for workers over the life cycle, it is worth first comparing the wage gains and losses from occupational mobility within firms with those for individuals changing firms. In Table 6 I reproduce Table 5 , but now I combine the three middle age categories (30-60) for power. 6 In Panel A, we see that wage growth may be a bit higher on average for individuals who change firms; however, the estimates are too noisy to reject that wage growth is the same. The point estimates are larger for young workers, suggesting they may have more to gain from between-firm movements, and are negative for workers over 60.
These estimates for wage growth for between-firm movements are somewhat smaller than other estimates from the literature. For instance, Topel and Ward (1992) find quarterly wage growth of 12 percent for firm-changers compared with 1.75 percent for firm-stayers. One difference may be that these annual wage observations may mask periods of nonemployment for between-firm movers. Indeed, in Forsythe (2018) I use a similar methodology but separate firm-changers between individuals who lost their jobs (e.g., displaced workers) and those who did not. In this case, nondisplaced workers had 3 percent faster wage growth than firm-stayers, for a total wage growth of 6 percent.
In Panel B of Table 6 , I separate wages by up or down occupational mobility and then by firm mobility interacted with the direction of occupational mobility. Here we see that the point estimates for upward and downward occupational mobility are very similar to those we see in Table 5 . When I separate the wage gains for firm-changers by the type of occupational mobility, we now see a more striking pattern. Individuals who move to higherranked occupations when changing firms now have wage gains that are over 7 percentage points larger than upward occupational movers within the firm, for a total wage growth of 14 percent. This pattern is especially strong for young workers, who find a total wage growth for upward moves between firms of 18 percent.
For individuals who move to lower-ranked occupations at new firms, wage growth is slower than for downward movers within-firms: 3.6 percentage points slower for all workers, for a total wage loss of 4.3 percentage points. Although the point estimates are not significant for the individual age groups, we can see that the magnitudes are smallest for young workers, suggesting that the penalty for downward movements between firms grows over the life cycle.
Thus, although average wage growth may be higher for between-firm movers, it depends on the direction of mobility, with downward-movers between firms experiencing larger losses.
For young workers, upward occupational moves between firms offer substantially faster wage growth than similar moves within the firm. Thus, even if young workers are able to replace falling between-firm mobility with additional mobility inside firms, it is unlikely to offer the same magnitude of wage growth, leading to lower wage growth over time. I measure this directly in the next section.
Changing Returns to Mobility over Time
Now that we have seen how wage growth differs by age and mobility, let's return to wage changes over time. Although we see earlier in this section that the falling rates of occupational mobility are primarily driven mechanically by falling rates of mobility between firms, in this section I investigate whether the returns to mobility over the time period.
As before, I use the tenure sample, which allows measurement of wage growth within and between firms, but restricts the sample to one month per year in alternating years. Since the sample size is small and noisy, I do not include confidence intervals on this set of graphs.
Although there is not enough power to discern annual changes, in the accompanying tables I show that many of the trends in point estimates are supported statistically by a test for differences in wage growth between groups of years. Table 7 , I test whether wage growth is slower during recessionary years. 7 Here we see negative point estimates, suggesting wage growth may have slowed, but the standard errors are too large to be conclusive.
In Figure 7 , I separate this wage growth into within-firm and between-firm wage changes, to determine the source of wage losses for young workers. I again compare wage changes for young and midcareer workers. The top graph of Figure 7 shows wage growth within firms.
Here we see that midcareer workers exhibit little cyclical or secular variation, receiving relatively consistent 2 percent wage growth across the time period, with an increase in wage growth after 2014. On the other hand, for young workers we see a strong secular decline in wage growth over the time period, with wage growth falling from a high of around 8 percent per year to around 5 percent in the mid-2000s, and falling to a nadir of −0.2 percent in 2010.
Since 2010, average wage growth within firms for young workers has recovered to around 5 percent. Although young workers have faster wage growth than midcareer workers for most of the time period, from 2010 to 2014 their wage growth within the firm fell below that for midcareer workers. By 2016 both groups experienced an acceleration of wage growth, with near identical point estimates.
The reduction of wage growth for young workers around the two recessionary periods suggests a cyclical response. However, in Columns (3) and (4) , 2001-2002, 2007-2008, 2009-2010, and 2011-2012. 21 firms. Young workers who move between firms exhibit relatively high wage growth until the Great Recession, at which point wage growth plummets from around 10 to −5 percent.
Nonetheless, in Column (5) of Table 7 , we see the series is too noisy to detect a statistically significant recessionary reduction in wage growth. For midcareer workers who move between firms, we see some evidence of a fall in the return to mobility during the Great Recession.
Nonetheless, in Table 7 , I show that wages are too imprecise to show any statistically distinct patterns.
Thus, at the same time as opportunities for mobility between firm fell for young workers, we see that wage growth plummeted for young workers. Further, this reduction in wage growth was primarily driven by falling wage growth within firms. Although we see a sharp decline in wage growth for young workers changing firms in the depth of the Great Recession, this was short lived and wage growth between firms for young workers quickly returned to prerecessionary levels. Table 8 , I show that wage changes after 2006 are on average 5 percentage points smaller for young workers. We see a similar pattern for midcareer workers, but with a smaller magnitude reduction in wage growth of about 4 percentage points, with midcareer workers experiencing wage growth that is about 1 percentage point larger than young workers making negative moves. Thus, although we see earlier that young workers experienced larger losses from downward moves within the firm than midcareer workers, this appears to be driven by trends in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
In graph (b) of Figure 8 , I examine wage growth for individuals moving to higher-ranked occupations within the firm. Recall from the previous section that young workers experienced substantially faster wage growth from upward moves within the firm than midcareer and older workers. When we examine how this has evolved over time, we see a much larger secular decline in wage growth for young workers who move to higher-ranked occupations within the firm. From a high of 19 percent in 2000, wage growth for young upward movers fell precipitously to a low of 1 percent in 2012. Wage growth for midcareer individuals followed a less extreme pattern, falling from 9 percent in 2000 to 1 percent in 2008; however, only young workers have statistically distinct wages in the second half of the sample.
In graphs (c) and (d) of Figure 8 , I turn to individuals changing occupations when also moving between firms. In graph (c), we see that wage changes for downward occupational changers between firms is largely constant over time; however, both young and midcareer workers experience a large drop in wages in 2010, to −17 percent for midcareer workers and −42 percent for young workers. However, for both types of workers, I am unable to detect a statistically significant change in wages over time or during the recessionary periods.
Finally, in graph (d), we see wages for upward movers between firms are relatively stable over the time period, but spike in 2016. This is enough to lead to positive point estimates for the second half of the period in Table 8 , but not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Here we see higher wage gains for young workers compared with midcareer workers, which is consistent with the larger average returns to upward mobility we see in the previous section.
Discussion
Instead of improving opportunities for young workers within firms, in this section we see that young workers' wage growth fell substantially from the mid-90s through 2014. Although dynamism of mobility between firms contributes to the aggregate reduction in wage growth, much of the fall is due to changing returns to upward and downward mobility within the firm.
This means that not only are young workers substantially less likely to change employers since the early 1990s, but average wage growth within the firm has also plummeted. For 23 midcareer workers, we do not see the same patterns.
Thus, there are two distinct patterns occurring within and between firms. For workers moving between firms, we see falling dynamism, which primarily impacts young workers, but no substantial variation in the returns to mobility. On the other hand, within firms, we see less in the way of changing dynamism, but substantial reduction in the returns to mobility for young workers specifically. Nonetheless, these patterns could be related if worsening outside options deteriorates the bargaining power for young workers, leading to reduced wage growth within the firm.
Although I find that the direction and magnitude of mobility are important indicators for the wage outcomes for workers changing occupations, there are crucial differences between wages and magnitude of occupational change. In this section, we see that the returns to upward mobility fall for young workers, despite no decline in the magnitude of occupational moves (see Appendix Figure A.1) . Similarly, in the section titled "Wage Returns to Mobility over the Life Cycle," we see that young workers receive larger wage gains than midcareer workers for similar-magnitude occupational changes.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have shown that internal occupational mobility is an important source of wage growth, especially for young workers. Although average wage changes with occupational mobility decline over the life cycle, this masks substantial variation in wage outcomes depending on the change in rank of the occupational quality. Across a wide variety of metrics, individuals who move to higher-ranked occupations experience faster wage growth than occupational stayers, and individuals who move to lower-ranked occupations experience slower wage growth. While upward occupational mobility can help individuals build their career, a substantial fraction move to lower-ranked occupations, leading to significant wage volatility over individuals' careers.
When I examine wage growth with mobility from 1996 through 2016, I find that wage growth for young workers declined substantially between 1996 and 2012. This was largely due to changing returns to occupational mobility inside the firm, especially for individuals moving to higher-ranked occupations. Midcareer workers and workers moving between firms experienced little of the same decline. Thus, in the first decade of the 2000s, young workers were hit by falling mobility between firms, reduced hiring, and diminished wage growth within the firm.
The fact that wage growth has ticked up in the past couple of years offers some possibility for optimism that young workers' fortunes may be improving. However, from the literature on the permanent effects of graduating during recessions (e.g., Kahn [2010] ; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz [2012] ), labor market conditions at the beginning of an individual career can have long-term effects on earnings. Even as the economy continues to improve we may see long-lasting scars for the workers who came of age in the beginning of this century. Coefficients from regressions based on the CPS monthly sample. Sample restricted to individuals who were employed in the first month of the sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.001. 
Appendix A
This appendix consists of summary statistics (Tables A.1 and A. 2), details about the source of the occupational ranking measures (Tables A.3 Mean and standard deviations of key variables for the two samples. Coefficients from regressions based on the CPS monthly sample. Sample restricted to female workers who changed occupations within the firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.001. Coefficients from regressions based on the CPS monthly sample. Sample restricted to male workers who changed occupations within the firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.001. 
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